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OPMERKINGEN EN AANTEKENINGEN - COMMUNICAT IONS 
MEASURING WELFARE OF PRODUCTIVE CONSUMERS* 
1 Scope of Article 
In the last few decades an increasing number of economists have contributed to new 
methods of welfare (or utility) measurement. As set out in this journal (Tinbergen, 1985) 
three groups of economists have been active in this field since 1968, initially relatively 
independently; an American, a British and a Dutch group, of which the leading econom- 
ists were Dale W. Jorgenson (Harvard), George W. McKenzie (Cambridge, UK) and 
Bernard M.S. van Praag (Erasmus). Additional imaginative contributions have been 
made since by several other economists, mentioned in my 1985 note. 1 In that same note 
I mentioned a lacuna in the Anglo-Saxon method: it considers utility derived from con- 
sumption but not utility (positive or negative) from work or from risk taking. The em- 
pirical research by the Dutch group implies all sources of satisfaction (in this article a 
third word for utility). The present article is an attempt o fill part of the lacuna stated, 
but simplified to the extreme, with the intention to clarify the essence of the additional 
aspect. 
Among the simplifications one must be mentioned in advance: the model submitted 
is static. This may be a disadvantage to some (or many) readers; and it may be avoided. 
Some remarks about a dynamic model will be made. Since the static version already 
introduces a number of new concepts the present author tentatively starts with the static 
version. 
2 One Individual's Utility from Consumption 
As usual we first consider one individual and the maximization of her or his satisfaction 
from consumption. Since another source of satisfaction will be added we push our sim- 
plification so far as possible and consider only one consumer good of which a quantity 
x is consumed, omitting at this stage the individual's uffix n. The utility caused by x 
is assumed to be In (x + 1). This function has the advantage of showing decreasing mar- 
* I am grateful to Professors Joop Hartog and Simon K. Kuipers for valuable comments on an 
earlier version of this communication. Remaining errors of course are mine. 
l A serious lacuna in my 1985 note was that the work by the well-known French economist 
Maurice Allais was not mentioned. His most recent contribution to the subject of measuring utility 
known to me is Allais (1984). The concepts used were developed from 1953 on, e.g. in La Psyeholo- 
gie de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque, la Th6orie et l'Exp~rience, Journal de la Socidtd de 
Statistique de Paris, Janvier-Mars 1953, pp. 47-73. 
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ginal utility 1/(x + 1) and in the extensive mpirical material collected by Van Praag 
et al. gave an equally good fit as the function chosen by them. Instead of my previous 
option for In x, I now prefer to add the + 1 term since that implies that utility of x = 0 
is zero. The difference may be very small if the unit of x is small, but we have good 
reasons for preferring large units, as will be set out in section 3. 
3 One Individual's Satisfaction from Work 
As another simplification we consider only one productive source of satisfaction, work, 
and neglect he possibility of contributing to production by supplying physical capital. 
We assume that the individual considered has a job and that his job can be characterized 
by a certain quantity of schooling required, s. The person will be characterized by a 
quantity of human capital, v, resulting from her or his formal schooling, e, completed 
and her or his innate abilities, u. Schooling required is based on some assumption about 
average innate abilities of the group of individuals from which the occupants of the job 
in question are usually recruited, but these assumptions are not explicity stated. The 
ability offered, v, results from u and e and we choose our functional forms and our units 
of measurement so as to make: 
v = u + e (3.1) 
These units will be called years of education, mainly because that is the concept on which 
a considerable quantity of statistical data is available. A more realistic approach, as pro- 
posed by De Wolff and Van Slijpe (1973), would be to give different weights to earlier 
and later years of schooling, but this will require still more preparatory research than 
the proposal under discussion and will not be pursued further. In addition to the con- 
cepts so far introduced one more will be introduced: the individual's maximum absorp- 
tion capacity ojformal schooling, & It is a - as yet unknown - function of innate capabili- 
ties, u. All schooling variables - s, v, e and g - will be measured in years of schooling. 
So will x and y. 
In reality, which must be described by a dynamic model, the individual first chooses 
an education (or formal schooling process) perhaps, but not necessarily already, based 
on a job desired, but the application for a job as a rule will follow education and be 
codetermined by the education completed. During the individual's career, training on 
the job will add to her or his ability, and series of consecutive jobs occupied as well. 
Society as a whole comprises individuals in each of the consecutive situations and innate 
ability classes. The single individual now studied is sort of an average of all and hence 
derives utility, positive or negative, from all the consecutive stituations. 
To the utility derived from consumption we add two additional terms: 
a ln(l  - -e )  -- ½~r(s-- v)2; ~ > O, cr > O (3,2) 
The first consitutes the utility from the formal schooling process. The expression I (1 - 
e/g) is zero for the start and tends to - oo when e approaches the individual's eduction 
absorption capacity. An individual who likes learning will have positive constant satis- 
faction in addition, but this is irrelevant for the process of utility maximization and so 
need not be mentioned. Such an individual will often have a high g and choose a high 
e.  
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The second addit ional term represents satisfaction from work. Again a positive con- 
stant has been omitted. The variable part has a maximum for s = v, where v matches 
s. Deviations on both sides are negative, and constitute the 'tension theory'  this author 
adheres to: people don't  like to have a job below their ability, but don't  like one above 
their ability either. Ability, in this oversimplified model, consists of schooling ability. 
AI! other relevant abilities, such as character or leadership, have been neglected. 
Both addit ional terms to the utility function are characterized by a coefficient, e and 
a respectively, expressing their intensity in comparison to the consumption term. Coeffi- 
cients are assumed to be the same for all individuals. Their individual characteristics 
are expressed by parameters, of which our examples are ~ and u. 
4 Optimizing One Individual's Welfare; The Production Function 
The welfare opt imum for one individual is found by maximizing welfare or utility under 
some restrictions. In the present case one restriction is the relation (3.1). The other is 
that total production, say y, is used for either consumption x or education e. If we mea- 
sure the latter as well as y in the same units, this implies 
y = x + e (4.0) 
Product ion will be the result of the job(s) held and will depend on both s and v. In an 
attempt o stick to the simplest approach possible I assume that product ion is rising 
with rising s and rising v: 
y = c~s + fly (4.l) 
As long as simplicity does not 'simplify away' the essence of our problem or, in a later 
stage, fits measured results, we stick to it. 2 The optimization process then reduces to 
maximize under two restrictions: 
(4.2) 
where 2 and/z  are Lagrange multipliers. The opt imum conditions are that the deriva- 
tives of co with regard to the unknowns x, e, s and v vanish and the two restrictions 
apply. This means: 
8co/~x = 1/(x + 1) --  2 = 0 (4.3) 
aco/ee  = -e / f ( l  - e /e )  - ;~ + u = 0 (4.4) 
5co/~s = --a(s -- v) + e2 = 0 (4.5) 
8co/~v = o-(s - v) + f12 -- # = 0 (4.6) 
2 Actually, in a recent publication Joop Hartog (1986) does find an interaction between s and 
v in a production function. Addition of a term in sv may introduce such interaction. 
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Elimination of 2 can be done by taking e (4.3) + (4.5): 
e/ (x  + 1) - ~r(s - v) = 0 (4.7) 
and elimination of/~ by (4.4) + (4.6) with 2 = 1/(x + 1): 
-e / ( (  - e)  + ( -1  + e + B)/(x + 1) = 0 or 
e/(~ - e) = (1 - 7 - - /3 ) / (x  + 1) (4 .8 )  
Writing (4.7) and (4.8) in a more appropriate form we get: 
x + 1 = o~/{tr(s -- v)} (4.9) 
-- e + e(x + 1)/(1 -- c~ --/3) (4.10) 
Our procedure can only be valid if s > v and ~ +/3 < 1. The conditions > v means that 
capacities are scarce, which applies widely. Whether c~ +/3 < 1 has wide validity, is less 
certain. If ct +/3 > l there may be no flat maximum of co. Empirical research is needed 
anyway; our example is kept simple, since it is an illustration only. The restrictions add: 
c~s +/3v = x + e (4.11) 
e = v - u (4.12) 
The solution of the last four equations for given c~,/3, e and ~ is easy. Even for a very 
crude statistical check we lack data on ~, and may have to disregard ifferences between 
e and v or assume them to be proportional with e < v in order to leave for u their differ- 
ence. This means that at least some statistical programs are suggested. Valuable data 
for s in the United States have been calculated by Rumberger (1981). 
5 Optimal Welfare of  a Population 
From the micromodel of section 4 we may now derive a macromodeP for a population 
(the total population of an area or a sample of such a total population). This means 
that we must aggregate the variables and parameters used for the description of an indi- 
vidual to variables or parameters of the population considered. Coefficients will remain 
the same, since we made the assumption that coefficients are identical for all individuals. 
The aggregated variables will be indicated by capital etters. Aggregation poses no prob- 
lem for linear equations. This is clearest for equations (4.1) and (4.2), which in the 
macro-model can be written: 
r= x+ E (5.1) 
3 A macromodel is what most of the authors quoted are aiming at, for instance to focus on in- 
equalities and the effect of income redistribution policies. If all relationships are linear the totals 
of the variables are simply N times the per capita values. 
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and 
Y = as  +/~v (5.2) 
where Y = ~y., J( = ~x., E = ~e., S = ~s., and V = ~]v.. 
tt n n n n 
Similarly (3.1) becomes, in the macromodel: 
v = u + E (5.3) 
where U may be called the innate ability of the population. 
The most important macro-equations must be derived from (4.9) and (4.10). The lat- 
ter equation, being linear as well, becomes 
- E = ~(x+ ~/ (1  - ~ - /~)  (5.4) 
where N is the highest n and the size of the population. Equation (4.9) had better be 
rewritten s - v = ~/(x  + l) and the macro-shape of the left-hand side S - V. Aggre- 
gation of the right-hand side requires the introduction of another macro-variable X' = 
1 1 
~x~,  ~ ~ l  and the equation becomes: 
s -  v=- Jc  (5.5) 
O- 
If the dispersion of the x n is modest, X' may be approximated by 1/(X + 1), though. 
The macro-formulae shown enable us to estimate the coefficients. Equation (5.2) may 
be used to estimate c~ and/~, (5.4) to estimate  and (5.5) to estimate . With their aid 
each individual's welfare may be estimated and the population's welfare 12 by aggregat- 
ing individual welfare. 
12 = • In (x .  + 1) + eZ ln(1  -- e./O.) -- ½¢rZ(s . -- v.) z 
n n n 
(5.6) 
6 Summary 
In this note an attempt is made to show, with the aid of the simplest example conceiv- 
able, how welfare estimates as made by Jorgenson et al. (see Jorgenson and Slesnick, 
1984, 1986) can be extended to include welfare derived from productive effort. It appears 
that notwithstanding the model's oversimplification the data are lacking which are 
needed to make numerical estimates. The missing data refer to Y, the formal schooling 
absorption capacity, and the information eeded to make a distinction between formal 
schooling eand total schooling v. In addition, of course, relevant other productive abili- 
ties should be included and the corresponding terms in the welfare function added. Fi- 
nally, both the production and the welfare function may have to be chosen differently 
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to obtain sufficient fit with observed values of the variables included. These aspects and 
several others have been given full attention by Jorgenson et al. 
Jan Tinbergen 
REFERENCES 
Allais, M. (1984), Determination ofCardinal Utility According to an Intrinsic Invariant Model, Sec- 
ond International Conference on Foundations of Utility and Risk Theory, Venice, 5-9 June 
1984. 
De Wolff, P. and A.R.D. van Slijpe (1973), 'The Relation Between Income, Education and Social 
Background,' European Economic Review, 17, pp. 235 264. 
Hartog, Joop (1986), 'Allocation and the Earnings Function,' Empec, 1 l, pp. 97-1 I0. 
Jorgenson, D.W. and D.T. Slesnick (1984), 'Inequality in the Distribution of Individual Welfare,' 
in: R. Basmann and G. Thodes (eds.), Advances in Econometrics, 3 pp. 67 130. 
Jorgenson, D.W. and D,T. Slesnick (1986), Redistribution Policy and the Elimination of Poverty, 
Discussion Paper Number 1227, Harvard Institute for Economic Research, April 1986. 
Rumberger, R.W. (1981), 'The Changing Skill Requirements ofJobs in the U.S. Economy,' Indus- 
trial and Labor Relations Review, 34, pp. 578-590. 
Tinbergen, J. (1985), 'Measurability of Utility (or Welfare),' De Economist, 133, pp. 411414. 
